A Phenomenological Critique of Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s Conception of Reason
|Title||A Phenomenological Critique of Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s Conception of Reason|
|Author(s)||Husain, Hafiz Syed|
|Chicago 16th||Husain, Hafiz Syed. "A Phenomenological Critique of Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s Conception of Reason." Al-Tafseer 33, no. 1 (2019).|
|APA 6th||Husain, H. S. (2019). A Phenomenological Critique of Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s Conception of Reason. Al-Tafseer, 33(1).|
|MHRA||Husain, Hafiz Syed. 2019. 'A Phenomenological Critique of Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s Conception of Reason', Al-Tafseer, 33.|
|MLA||Husain, Hafiz Syed. "A Phenomenological Critique of Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s Conception of Reason." Al-Tafseer 33.1 (2019). Print.|
|Harvard||HUSAIN, H. S. 2019. A Phenomenological Critique of Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s Conception of Reason. Al-Tafseer, 33.|
This paper expounds a critique of Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s conception of reason. Khan conceived reason (‘Aql) as a harmonious coordination of two of its aspects or sub-structures: ‘Aql-e-Insānī or ‘Aql-e-Kullī and Nūr-e-Qalb or Nūr-e-Fitrat. It is argued that these two perspectival conceptualizings of reason presume fundamental theses which disrupt any possibility of such coordination. By the method of comparison and analysis predominantly motivated by phenomenological methodology, this investigation explains how these fundamental presuppositions disrupt the proposed coordination along three descriptive contours: (i) reason-in-itself, (ii) the goal of reason, and (iii) the directedness of reason. The purpose of this study is to develop an understanding of the problem of reason which can philosophically set the possibility of limited and scrutinized mutual critical reevaluations between secular and Islamic sciences
Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s Usūl-e-Tafsīr (1998) presents the fundamental principles of his Qurānic hermeneutics. These principles constitute a reasoned understanding of Qurān. This reasoned understanding of Qurān, which he deemed modern Ilm al-Kalām is based upon a particular conception of reason (al-‘Aql) one aspect of which he called ‘Aql-e-Insāni or ‘Aql-e-Kulli. It is the faculty responsible for making objective generalizations from particular observations. This is what has rendered sciences and technologies, in other words, civilization possible (Khan, 1998, pp. 567-568). In his essay Insān ke Khayalāt (Khan, 1990, pp. 249-256) he claims that this reason is goal-directed. He considers this goal to be the knowledge and certitude—inasmuch as both are equal—such that faith is already a principal part of this knowledge. Here, knowledge amounts to the metaphysical reality of all things (Khan, 1991, p. 3). However, according to him, reason—historically speaking—has always been striving for this goal without actually achieving it. Science and technology—at a particular phase in history—are particular temporal developments of this reason’s striving. On the other hand, past religions (Judaism as in the times of Moses and Christianity for instance, or the differences in the revelations of past prophets) are also its temporal developments. Qurān, and thus Islam as revealed to Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), constitutes its pivot. This is how Khan has taken the same position as of the early Muslim theologians and philosophers that there is no contradiction between faith and reason. The only difference is that, for the latter, reason meant secular knowledge as grounded by philosophy (Greek Logos), whereas for the former it was Kalām (again Greek inspired Logos). However, for Khan, it is a particular historical manifestation of reason. This is the point which is usually missed when he is regarded a scientific naturalist. Though he explicitly repudiates the findings of Ptolemy’s cosmology (inspired by Greek philosophy; in particular Aristotle) in favor of modern physics of Newton, just as he rejects traditional interpretations which stands in defiance against science— for instance regarding the possibility of miracle—but since this repudiation leaves out both logic and mathematics, and since he has explicitly mentioned the possibility of historical development in reason, scientific development of his time (i.e. Newton’s physics in particular) is only a particular stage or phase of reason’s developmental accomplishment. Thus, Abdul Hafeez Fāzlī (2017, pp. 254-255) is partly correct in claiming that Khan’s hermeneutic commitments meant the following maxim: any interpretation of Qurān that goes against the dictates of modern science must be reinterpreted such that the claim of Qurān is reconciled with science inasmuch as science characterizes the achievements of ‘Aql-e-Kulli. But it only forms a part of the story. Since science itself, according to Khan, manifests only a stage in development of reason towards its goal, this interpretation presumes the possibility of its own subversion. This means that a particular reconciliation so made can always change, at least in principle. In other words, Khan’s Tafsīr-ul-Qurān itself —according to its own principles—is just one such interpretation among many further possible different interpretations insofar as the principles are kept intact.
This Tafsīr marks a particular phase with a progressive dimension that only history can reveal through further advances in sciences. We find ourselves justified in making a distinction between the interpretation (Tafsīr) and the principles as its precondition. The philosophical significance of these fifteen principles comes down to be one of informative of the structure with which reason is historically unfolding through the development of sciences, arts and technologies. It is not just a subjugation of Qurān under science, which apparently it is, but an indicative of something that is neither science nor the sedimented tradition of Qurānic interpretations (Tafasīr). These principles presume as well the historical unfolding of reason as such, insofar as this reason holds its goal as a regulative ideal towards which both philosophy and science aspires but Qurān embodies it.
Thus, reason for Khan has at least two different motivational sources; science and another source which we may call ‘practical.’ Latter is what finds its manifestations in Prophetic tradition. If reason could be reducible to the former then we could just equate his conception of reason with scientific rationality. But we have many textual evidences that there is more to it. It is the aspect that we have called ‘practical’ which requires an elaboration in this respect. Second, which correlates with the first, is his conception of nature (Fitrat). In what follows, we will see that this too is not equal to the nature that is revealed in science.
In order to further elaborate the practical aspect of reason, we note that besides the notion of reason captured as ‘Aql-e-Insānī or ‘Aql-e-Kullī—which indeed corresponds to the capacity of scientific rationality —he also talks about reason as ‘light of the heart’ or the ‘light of nature’ (Nūr-e-Qalb or Nūr-e-Fitrat) (Khan, 1993, pp. 251-253). This is certainly not the mystical (Sūfiyana) capacity of revelation (Mukāshfa) for he explicitly expelled it from reliable knowledge (Khan, 1983, pp. 110-113). This aspect of reason is explained as being a natural (Fitrī) capacity or faculty (Quwwat) responsible for a radical critique which has the potential to transform the tradition (my emphasis). This reason is inherently moral or practical and it is primarily this reason by virtue of which man is capable of being superior to animals. Prophets embodied this reason. He explicitly mentioned both, Ibrahīm (A.S.) and Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) who manifested the embodiment of this reason par excellence which corresponds to nothing but the capacity of prophethood (Malaka-e-Nabuwwat) as such signified by the propername Jibra’īl. Just like science was the achievement of ‘Aql-e-Insāni or ‘Aql-e-Kulli, Islam is the achievement of this aspect of reason. It is Khan’s thesis that since both have their origin in God (as being the First Cause), and since God is perfect, the two aspects can never contradict. As far as the principal existence of these two aspects is concerned, they both mirror each other. This implies that neither there is any principal priority of ‘Aql-e-Kulli or the scientific rationality over this practical aspect of reason, nor practical reason and its achievements have any such priority over the other. Just like sciences—Newton’s physics for instance—manifested the achievements of scientific rationality, Islamic sciences—e.g. Tafsīr, Hadīth, Fiqh, Kalām, etc.—manifested the achievements of the practical reason. The two aspects apparently come in conflict with each other under the dialectical tensions of tradition vs. reason as Naql aur ‘Aql main Mukhālifat (Khan, 1984, pp. 234-238), Dīn aur Duniyā ka Rishta (Khan, 1990, pp. 82-86) and the debate of Ilm-ul-Riwāyah-wa-al-Darāyah in Ahādīth (Khan, 1983, pp. 41-59) and in the following essays (ibid, pp. 60-89). The concept of reason employed here does seem to be subjugated to scientific rationality, especially when tradition (as Naql) seems to offer something that is scientifically unacceptable. However, there is a possibility of a critique of tradition which can be intrinsically initiated following the precedent of Darāyah such that this critique does not contradict reason as ‘Aql-Kullī. Khan (1983, pp. 41-59) explicitly acknowledges this fact, though laments that it remained underdeveloped. But it is the totalizing subjugation of Islamic interpretations (the achievements of Nūr-e-Qalb) under scientific rationality which is the cause of serious concern. It is the underlying assumption that since God created both nature and ‘Aql, and since He is perfect, achievements from both aspects of reason must confirm each other. If there is any conflict between them, then the dictates of one—which usually came down to be the scientific rationality—can assume the other under its jurisdiction. This is the meaning of harmonious coordination.
2. Research Hypothesis, Objective and Methodology
We thus find many discrepancies in Khan’s account when it comes to understanding what he means by reason. But this only shows that Khan was mistaken in his conceptualizing of reason inasmuch as he thought it to be a harmonious coordination of the twofold structure, predominantly by presupposing unwarranted theses. This leads us to the following hypothesis: It is possible that a critique of Khan’s conception of reason may help in developing a better understanding of the problem of reason. By ‘understanding the problem of reason,’ this investigation means the basic indicators which must be addressed before any structure or account can be claimed to be an answer to the question: what is reason?
This may sound counter-intuitive. For one may wonder what one might really mean by ‘understanding the problem of reason?’ Here, author’s investigation is primarily inspired by the phenomenological methodology. It is beyond the scope of this investigation to present the full background. For a detail of phenomenological method, one may be referred to (Manen, 1990; Moran, 2000 & Zahavi, 2003). According to this, the most important thing to investigate is the right way to question. For instance, in order to investigate reason, one should not just ask: ‘what is reason?’ For this already presumes that one knows—to some extent—what reason is, for if one was absolutely unaware of what the reason is, then asking and looking forward does not make any sense. Thus, when phenomenology aims at understanding the problem of, say anything ‘X’, then it is primarily after those fundamental presumptions which must be satisfied or addressed before anyone even starts to look for an answer to the question ‘what is X?’. These fundamental presuppositions corresponding to ‘X’ exist simultaneously at both, the level of tradition and at the level of everyday-life employment of ‘X’ correlatively. What is more important is that the sought phenomenological understanding consists of a structure formed by these fundamental presuppositions. We may elaborate this briefly with the help of an example from Edmund Husserl—the founder of phenomenology. Husserl (1991), in his On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, worked out the phenomenology of time (i.e. ‘X’ being equal to time in Husserl’s investigation). The ultimate aim was to work out a descriptive structure of preconditions which have to be presupposed if one is ever to have a possibility of temporally constituted experience. Here, though he apparently made use of the scrupulous observations pertaining to the everyday-life experiences of time (cf. for instance , however, beneath this apparent concrete analysis, Husserl was in continuous dialogue with how time has already been reflectively and practically intended in Western tradition. The result was the intentional structure of time-consciousness which can be claimed to be responsible for the very possibility of universal conscious life . In present research, it is ‘reason’ inasmuch as it is intended in Aligarh episode of Islamic historical consciousness founded by Sayyid Ahmad Khan. At this latter point, we need phenomenology that is intrinsically hermeneutic; especially as expounded by Ricoeur (2016a & 2016b). This is because the intentionality—the phenomenological concept which captures the most primordial way of our immersion in this world —if restricted to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology only, would diminish hermeneutic possibilities (Ricoeur, 1988, pp. 23-43). What we require is a historical intentionality, that is to say, our most primordial way of being engaged with the world that allows taking into account what has been historically intended as well.
We reached the hypothesis by a comparative analysis through Khan’s text. Drawing from this hypothesis we state the fundamental research objective which this study aims at: To work out the critique of Khan’s conception of reason with the intention of finding the basic indicators which must be addressed before any theoretic investigation can initiate a study to answer the question: what is reason? These indicators are precisely which form the phenomenologically desired structure for understanding the problem of reason.
3. The Critique and the Desired Indicators
A critique is an attempt to work out the structure of fundamental presumptions. Following scrupulously through Khan’s writings, this study claims that there are three headings which together form the desired structure: (i) reason-in-itself, (ii) its goal, and (iii) its directedness (or historical intentionality) towards its goal.
We have already remarked—following —how Khan had two correlative and apparently harmonious notion of reason: ‘Aql-e-Kulli or ‘Aql-e-Insānī and Nūr-e-Qalb or Nūr-e-Fitrat. Former can be characterized as scientific rationality and the latter as practical reason inasmuch as sciences and technologies are achievements of the former whereas Islam as Islamic consciousness (fundamental ethical principles of a particular Islamic society responsible for forming a collective conscience) is the same for the latter. This Islamic consciousness is reflexively informed by the achievements of Islamic sciences. Just like science can be mistaken at a particular period of history in capturing some particular aspect of nature (Fitrat)—the possibility of which Khan fully and explicitly acknowledges—similarly, Islamic sciences, and correlatively, Islamic consciousness can also be found to be mistaken in understanding the very same nature as well. What Khan predominantly has been trying to do is to critique the Islamic consciousness via both, critiquing Islamic sciences by confronting them with scientific rationality insofar as such a confrontation makes sense and critiquing Islamic consciousness in general by a critique that is internal to it.
What if we can validly argue that both scientific rationality and practical reason have structures which are either incomparable or whenever comparable, it is practical reason which grounds scientific reason and not the other way round? Furthermore, that this grounding of scientific rationality or reason does not exclude the possibility of critical reevaluation of any particular achievement of practical reason under the light of scientific rationality? If there is such an argument that can substantiate this then Khan would be both right, in some aspects of his argument, and wrong (in others). He would be right to think that a limited critical reevaluation of Islamic consciousness is possible through a confrontation of Islamic interpretations against the discoveries of modern sciences—which can now also include social sciences. But he would be wrong in thinking that both aspects of reason correlated harmoniously and so a totalizing critique of Islamic interpretations—Islamic consciousness—geared by sciences and scientific view of the world, is a mistake.
Indeed, Khan is right in thinking that there is only one nature (Fitrat) whether approached through ‘Aql or Naql, also that there should be no conflict between them in principle. However, the problem lies in equating this Qurānic reference to ‘Aql with what lies behind modern Western scientific rationality (henceforth referred as SR). Unfortunately, Khan never made any attempt to critique SR. On the contrary, as will be shown in what follows, no matter how we critique SR, the source capacity that renders modern sciences possible is certainly not equal to Qurānic conception of ‘Aql and ‘Ilm. The closer semantic equivalents of ‘Aql include: al-bāb (pl. of lub’) as in ‘ul-il-albāb’ (2:179), Tadab’bur as in ‘afalā yatadab’barūn-al-Qurāna…aqfāluha’ (47:24) or as in (4:82) or Nuh’ya as in ‘li-ulin’niha’ (20:128), so on and so forth. It is important that Qurānic conception of ‘Aql as in ya’qilūn, ta’qilūn, aqalūh (2:75) etc. does not make sharp philosophical or theoretic distinction between ‘Aql as such and ‘Ilm (cf. translation and interpretation of (2:75) in ). Following the same spirit, the early Muslim generations (Sahāba and Taba’īn) did not make any distinction between ‘Aql and Naql as such either, since for them, ‘Ilm primarily was ‘Ilm-e-Hadīth or anything to which an authentic tradition (Sanad) could be presented . On the contrary, scientific rationality—especially as exhibited in the works of eighteenth and nineteenth century classical physics—must make a distinction between scientific knowledge as the achievement of theoretic or scientific reason inasmuch as the latter is the source capacity that makes former possible. Otherwise, the whole endeavor would become epistemologically circular, something which no rationality can afford.
There have been many attempts on part of West to pursue such a critique. There are at least three major nexuses of such critiques: critical theoretic, hermeneutic and phenomenological. Although, these nexuses differ in their philosophical methodologies, however, they all agree that the structure of SR is not autonomous. It requires a further grounding in practical, everyday life. It is beyond the scope of this paper to clarify exact nature of this grounding (for instance, cf. for a possibility of how Kant’s transcendental philosophy can be seen to be the ground of SR inasmuch as it was expounded in his Critique of Pure Reason and how it failed in providing it the epistemological autonomy). The important point is that SR cannot claim an absolute epistemological autonomy, which means that practical matters—especially traditional values, e.g. belief systems, social or cultural practices etc. which Khan also thought to be forming the content of consciousness (Khan, 1984, pp. 1-15)—cannot all be subjugated to its scrutiny. Thus, if ‘Aql-e-Kulli or ‘Aql-e-Insānī is motivated by SR then Khan is wrong—even by his own standards—in indefinitely subjugating Islamic interpretations or the contents of Islamic consciousness under its scrutiny. This by no means establishes that the Western critique of its own SR establishes Khan’s notion of Nūr-e-Qalb or Nūr-e-Fitrat as being more primordial. It is certainly not harmonious with ‘Aql-e-Kulli or ‘Aql-e-Insānī anymore under this critique, granting that it exists. As far as the exact nature of the existence and its relation with SR is concerned, at best, we can only remain silent as far as Western critique of SR is concerned in context of the above three nexuses. Thus, Khan’s account of reason-as-such or reason-in-itself which corresponds to the harmonious correlation between both of his conceptions of reason (‘Aql) is based upon uncritical, in fact misunderstood, conception of SR.
(ii)The Goal of Reason: God as the Creator of Nature (Fitrat)
As already remarked above, according to Khan, the goal of reason is the knowledge of the reality of all things. Unfortunately, this begs the question, for it naively presupposes that the ‘reality of all things’ is a thing. This philosophical naiveté could only be overcome by formulating the concept of the ‘reality of all things’ either by the methods of Greeks (for instance, Aristotle or Plato), or—following Martin Heidegger—by the phenomenological question of the meaning of Being. These philosophical naivetés are one main reason why Khan was not being able to pose the question properly about Fitrat, ‘Aql, ‘Ilm, etc. let alone coherently clarify them. If one objects that the philosophical naiveté is a redundant charge on Khan for he repudiates philosophy, especially the cosmological view of the mediaeval Latin world inspired by Ptolemy, or the metaphysical pluralism of Pre-Socratics (Khan, 1984, p. 283), then one just has to read: ‘But contrary to them, we believe that the more natural science and philosophy progress, the more firm would become the belief in the existence and glory of God’ (ibid, p. 276, my emphasis and translation). Thus, philosophy for Khan is not always an endeavor to be seen with condemnation.
However, Khan apparently has a way out of it, for he proposes what he means by the ‘reality of all things:’ it is God (Khan, 1984, pp. 277, 301-318). The perfect knowledge of this is impossible. Both science and religion strive for it (ibid, pp. 299-300). However, since both science and religion differ in their respective ways for striving towards it, science falls short and remains at the level of the ‘laws of nature,’ whereas religion aims ahead at who created this very nature according to the very same laws. Thus the goal of both the secular science and the Islamic science is different. Since reason can neither be divorced from its goal nor its direction or aiming at this goal, the achievements or interpretations of reason which has faith at its roots cannot be totally subjugated to the critique of science. One may have no objection in a limited critical reevaluation of Islamic interpretations under scientific scrutiny, but it is Khan’s over optimistic trust in the natural sciences which is problematic. Furthermore, Khan is explicitly against the mechanical conception of nature (ibid pp. 283ff), however, there seems to be no way how he could reconcile this with the scientific view of the world that aims at the mechanically leading laws of nature.
(iii) The Directedness in Reason
Khan never conceptualized the phenomenon of directedness in the structure of reason as such. But his concrete observations and reflections bear witness to its existence. As already remarked above, reason (‘Aql) for Khan has always been striving towards its goal. The ultimate goal is God. This striving is not theoretic but historical. Both history of Islam (as the prophetic tradition which includes Judaism and Christianity) and history of secular science—from Greek philosophy till modern Newtonian Physics—are historical manifestations of this direction. Greek philosophy was led astray by over speculation. Modern scientific rationality corrected this deficiency. Similarly, we see a gradual progressive development in prophetic revelation towards God’s final message which correlated with the progress of human mind at the level of civilization (Khan, 1993, pp. 139-150). This direction is one of progress towards its goal. Though there have been disruption points, for instance, falsification of Greek and Latin cosmologies by Copernican and Newtonian physics, and similarly, change or rescission (Tansīkh or Naskh) which occurred in the form of revelation of Qurān, but these disruptions are not to be taken negatively, for they are exactly what constitute the direction of reason-in-itself—the harmonious correlation of the two aspects of ‘Aql. In fact, directedness is nothing but a coordinated structure of these disruptions. Qurān marks the pivot of this development on the side of religion but there is no such equivalent on the side of science. In this connection, future developments of secular and Islamic sciences correspond to each other as the historical development of reason’s striving towards its goal. Thus, we do not have a harmonious correlated direction of development. Instead of two, we are getting three terms to match. We have changes or rescissions (disruptions) which correspond to the prophetic development which finds its zenith in Qurān, we have overall progressive development through disruptions via secular sciences, and finally we have apparently stagnant Islamic sciences which developed and are now being made progressive by disruptions of Khan’s own self-proclaimed efforts.<ref name="ftn19">. In his essay Tabqāt-e-Ulūm-ud-Dīn (Khan S. S., 1983, pp. 36-40) Khan implicitly claimed that what the reformist thinking of Ghazāli (though his Ihyā-ul-Ulūm-ul-Dīn) and Shah Waliullah (through his Huj’jatul’lahul Balighah) were aiming at (i.e. Asrār-e-Ulūm-ul-Dīn) is the same what Khan is aiming at too.
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- . Khan’s principles of interpretations—Usūl-e-Tafsīr—were published separately titled as Tahrīr-fī-Usūl-e-Tafsīr. They were first published around 1892 . However, whenever cited in this paper, its reference from should be considered only.
- . Unfortunately, Khan is too naïve at this point. Claiming that knowledge amounts to knowing the reality of all things begs the question. This philosophical naiveté could only be overcome by formulating the concept of the ‘reality of all things’ either by the method of Greeks (for instance, Aristotle or Plato), or—following Martin Heidegger— by the phenomenological question of the meaning of Being. These philosophical naivetés are one main reason for not being able to pose the question about Fitrat, ‘Aql, Ilm, etc. let alone coherently clarify them.
- . For instance, in the essay Behes Nāsikh-o-Mansūkh (Khan S. S., 1983, pp. 100-103), Sr Sayyid argues that the change that is genreally refered as Naskh is one of the change that corresponds to the revelation of the past prophets; cf. also (Khan S. S., 1990, pp. 1-9)
- . Logos (meaning wisdom or reasoned account of reality) was already accounted and much debated among early and later Greek philosophers; among whom included Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. Author would refer (Wolfson, 1976, pp. 1-42) for a detailed investigation of how logos and Kalām—which originally meant speech—are interlinked in Muslim theology; cf. also for the significance of the meaning of Kalām and the development of the School of Mutakal’limūn.
- . Cf. (Khan S. S., 1983, pp. 90ff) where Khan cites an Arabic Scholar who cites Ghazālī in context of appreciating logic as the achievement of Greeks (ibid. p 92).
- . Cf. the detailed discussion of fifteenth rule in .
- . Cf. Qurān (2:90-92), and its tafsīr in , especially in context of verse 92; also cf. .
- . Cf. interpretation of cosmic division of the sky into twelve zodiac signs and the cosmological phenomenon of shooting stars (Khan, S. S., 1993, pp. 214-221)
- . Cf. for an explicit reference to Augustine’s Confessions. Among others, cf. ibid. p. 249n6 and 264 for David Hume, ibid. p. 72, 111ff, 234ff for his use of mathematical analogies, ibid. p. 357 and 362ff for Descartes, ibid. p. 253 for both Plato and Aristotle, etc.
- . Cf. and for the phenomenological concept of intentionality which philosophically characterize the phenomenon of intrinsic directedness of consciousness. Author’s concept of directedness is primarily motivated from his phenomenological presumptions.
- . Author refers to Conscience in (1983, pp. 1-15) and Mazhab-o-Mu’āshrat in (1990, pp. 1-9), where he explicitly draws a distinction between the use of practical reason that is critically authentic and its use which is culturally biased. Conscience, according to him is culturally biased. It does not mean that it is wrong, but that it may contain errors.
- . Cf. Qurān (16:12), (13:2), in particular, (46:4). Latter—when seen in conjunction with the former two—clearly establishes that for Qurān the evidence for unity (Tawhīd) of God and nature (Fitrat) as His creation does not presume the dichotomy of ‘Aql vs. Naql.
- . The reference (m:n) from Qurān refers to chapter ‘m’, verse ‘n’ respectively throughout in this paper.
- . I would refer for a discussion of the philosophical critique of SR from critical theoretic perspective; for a hermeneutic account of how Kantian transcendental philosophy, as expounded in his Critique of Pure Reason, can be seen as such a critique which failed in its justification for autonomy; and cf. for a phenomenological critique. All of these show that SR is not to be construed naively as given or presumed in the methods of sciences (including social sciences).
- . Author fully acknowledges that these are not the only philosophically viable ways to pose the problem of reality. There are critical philosophical schools—for instance, both analytic tradition and pragmatism along with critical theorists—which may altogether dissolve the question of the ‘reality of all things’
- . Cf. (Khan, S. S., 1984, pp. 277-282); my emphasis, translation slightly modified; cf. ibid, p. 282.
- . Cf. (Khan S. S., 1983, pp. 100-103), (Khan S. S., 1993, pp. 139-150).